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TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN LIFE BUT NOT IN
DEATH: THE EXECUTION OF THE
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED
AFTER ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
PENNY J. WHITE*

Shortly after the UnitedStates Supreme Courtdecided Atkins v. Virginia
in 2002, I found myself working on a case involving a death-sentenced
mentally retarded man. The more I learned about the decision and the
disability, the more convinced I became that my work would result in a life
sentence for the man. But I was wrong. To date, that has not happened.
Instead, despite every testifying expert's opinion that Heck Van Tran is
mentally retarded,he awaits execution on Tennessee's death row, largely
because of state judicial interpretations that have eviscerated Atkins'
guarantee. Tran is not alone. All across America individuals who would
qualify for classificationas an intellectually disabled,or mentally retarded,
citizen await death as a result of state statutes andjudicial decisions that
circumvent Atkins' promise.In an effort to assistless experiencedpractitioners
presenting Atkins claims, this Article exposes some of the methods used to
thwart Atkins' promise with the ultimate hope that those who are treated
differently in life because of their disabilities will ultimately be treated
differently in death as well.
INTRODUCTION

When the United States Supreme Court barred the execution of the
mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia,' it declined to establish either a uniform
definition of mental retardation or a uniform procedure to be followed in
determining the existence of retardation, instead deferring the matter to the
individual states.2 The Court's deferral has resulted in an incongruity with a
perverse result: The Eighth Amendment takes on different meanings in
different states. Even if every state faithfully applies its own laws,
constitutional violations will occur. Thus, the full scope and protection of a
fundamental right, the right of a mentally retarded offender to be spared
execution, is wholly contingent upon state definitions and procedures. Because
" This article is dedicated to Heck Van Tran; to his courageous and tireless lawyer,
Brock Mehler, who gave the University of Tennessee College of Law Death Penalty Clinic the
opportunity to draft his petition for certiorari; and to the students who helped-Noel Halpin,
Daniel Headrick, Ellis Lord, Zanele Ngubeni, and Bill Reider.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
2. See id. ("Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with
the judgment of 'the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter' and concluded that
death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.").
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mental retardation refers to a single, small class of individuals, the use of
varying definitions or procedures can actually mean the difference between life
and death. Identical offenders who commit identical crimes in different
jurisdictions may be executed in one, while spared in the other. Surely this
anomaly should not exist. The Eighth Amendment must have the same meaning
in all capital punishment jurisdictions.
This Article identifies the effects of the hodgepodge of definitions,
interpretations, and procedures that Atkins'deference to the states has generated
and urges an adoption of uniform standards and procedures in each state that
allows capital punishment. Part I of this Article outlines the underlying
premises of Atkins and its resulting promise to mentally retarded defendants.
Part II discusses the three elements of the most commonly used definitions of
mental retardation-intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior, and age of
onset-and explains how the varied use and interpretation of these definitions
has resulted in inconsistent state decisions. Finally, some suggestions for
reconciliation to meet the promise of Atkins are offered.
I. ATKINS' UNDERLYING PREMISES AND RESULTING PROMISE
A. Honoring the Recognition that Death Is Different
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution barred the execution of
the mentally retarded.3 Though unstated, the decision clearly rested on a central
premise of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: Death is
different.4 Because of its difference in degree and kind, a death sentence must
3. Id. In the decade leading up to Atkins, the United Nations special rapporteur on
executions received reports that the mentally retarded were being executed in only three
countries: Japan, Kyrgyzstan, and the United States. Simon H. Fisherow, Follow the Leader?:
JapanShould FormallyAbolish the Execution ofthe Mentally Retardedin the Wake of Atkins
v. Virginia, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 455,456 (2005) (citing The Special Rapporteur, Report
ofthe SpecialRapporteuron Extrajudicial,Summary or ArbitraryExecutions, 380, delivered
to the Commn on Human Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1995/61 (1994); Brief for The European
Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975
(2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL 648605).
4. Justice Stewart, for example, highlighted the unique nature of capital punishment in
Furmanv. Georgiain 1972:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but
in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of
the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Within twelve years of Furman, every
member of the Court would agree with Justice Stewart's analysis:
In the 12 years since Furman... every Member of this Court has written or joined at least
one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the
death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence must be
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serve the penological purposes of capital punishment; 5 because of its
irrevocability, a death sentence must be preceded by safeguards that produce a
fair and reliable result. 6
B. Honoringthe Narrowing Requirement
The Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia interpreted the Eighth
Amendment as requiring the class of defendants eligible for capital punishment
to be narrowed to provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not, 7 Thus, the death penalty is reserved for a smaller, more culpable class of
defendants. Mentally retarded individuals 8 suffer from cognitive impairments
accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given
offense.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
5. In a joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, three members of the Court identified
"retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders" as the primary purposes
served by capital punishment. 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.,
plurality opinion). The Atkins Court noted that "[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty on a
mentally retarded person 'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering," and hence an
unconstitutional punishment.' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977))).
6. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (discussing the importance of
mitigating evidence in capital cases). The Atkins Court noted that "[t]he risk 'that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty"' is high in
cases involving mentally retarded defendants. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (quoting Lockett, 438
U.S. at 605). "Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution." Id.at 321; see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2846 (2007) (finding a
constitutional violation when a state court failed to provide procedural protections to a deathsentenced inmate on the issue of competency to be executed).
7. See Furman,408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (noting the "great infrequency"
in which the death penalty is applied); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28
(1980) (citing the Furman requirement that death penalty laws be applied equitably); Gregg,
428 U.S. at 188 (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion) ("Because of the uniqueness
of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.").
8. At the time of the Atkins decision, the American Association on Mental Retardation
("AAMR") defined mental retardation as "substantial limitations in present functioning...
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with
related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and
safety, functional academics, leisure, and work." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. In 2002, the
AAMR revised its definition of mental retardation but retained the use of the term. AM. ASS'N
OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS
OF SUPPORTS

xii (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR]. Upon urging, in 2006 the AAMR changed
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that do not enable them to possess the level of moral culpability that society
deems essential to impose a sentence of death. 9 Because of this diminished
culpability, the execution of a mentally retarded offender would neither act as a
deterrent' ° nor "measurably contribute to the retributive end" of capital
punishment." Hence, the execution of a mentally retarded offender would
violate the Eighth Amendment's narrowing principle, which requires that only
the most deserving of execution are put to death.'
States must define mental retardation for the purpose of capital punishment
in a manner that gives effect to that principle. If a state's definition (or its
judicial interpretations of the definition) fails to exclude the mentally retarded
from execution, the state violates the Eighth Amendment.
C. Honoring the HeightenedFairnessandReliability Requirements
The constitutionality of any death sentence depends upon a fair decisionmaking process, which assures that a death sentence is not imposed in an
arbitrary, discriminatory, or capricious manner. The "qualitative difference" in
a sentence of death demands "a corresponding difference in the need for
its name to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
("AAIDD"), and consequently, later adopted the term "intellectual disability" in lieu of"mental
retardation." Press Release, American Ass'n on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,
World's Oldest Organization on Intellectual Disability Has a Progressive New Name 120 (Nov.
2, 2006), available at http://www.aamr.org/news/newsitem.cfin?OID=1314. The term
"intellectual disability" is the "currently preferred term" for the mental health profession, and
includes the same "population of individuals who were diagnosed previously with mental
retardation in number, kind, level, type, and duration of the disability ..." Robert L. Schalock
et al., The RenamingofMental Retardation: Understandingthe Changeto the Term Intellectual
Disability, 45 INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DisAmrIEs 116, 120 (2007) (noting that the
medical profession has used several terms over the last 200 years, but that the "three essential
elements... have not changed substantially"). Because the term "mental retardation" was used
in Atkins and continues to be used in the civil and criminal justice systems and in state and
federal regulations (including regulations pertaining to the Americans with Disabilities Act), it
will be used in this Article. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(l)(i)(B) (2009) (instructing that "physical or
mental impairment" includes mental retardation).
9. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 ("[S]ociety views mentally retarded offenders as categorically
less culpable than the average criminal.").
10. Proponents of capital punishment often cite its role in deterrence as support for their
position. However, mentally retarded offenders suffer from cognitive impairments like "the
diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in
logical reasoning, or to control impulses" that lessen their ability to choose their behavior and
control their conduct, thus diminishing any deterring effect. Id.at 320.
11. Retribution for crime is based on the theory that offenders should get what they
deserve. However, "the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the
culpability of the offender.... If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient tojustify
the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution." Id.at 319.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case."' 3 Moreover, the Eighth Amendment forbids "procedural rules
4
that tend[] to diminish the reliability" of the death penalty determination.'
A mentally retarded offender suffers cognitive impairments that hinder the
individual's ability to process information, make decisions, communicate, and
relate to others.' These hindrances affect the individual's ability to assist
counsel, testify, "make a persuasive showing of mitigation,' 6 and in turn, the
' 7
hindrances "jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings."'
Thus, a mentally retarded offender faces an increased risk of wrongful
execution. 18
D. Honoring the Atkins Promise
The promise ofAtkins is that the mentally retarded will not be executed.' 9
Although the Supreme Court deferred the matter of defining mental retardation
and the procedures used to determine its existence to the states, 20 its categorical
ban on the execution of the mentally retarded nevertheless requires states to
adhere to the basic principles of Atkins in both respects. Because the Atkins
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment as restricting the execution of any
mentally retarded offender, 2' states should apply consistent, appropriate, and
reliable standards and procedures. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment takes on
22
meanings in various locations, returning the country to a pre-Furman
varied
scheme of capital punishment.
II. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
Even though the Atkins Court deferred the task of developing ways to
enforce its holding, it recognized that "statutory definitions of mental
retardation... generally conform to [certain] clinical definitions. 2 3 The Court
relied specifically on definitions provided by the American Psychiatric
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
14. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
15. See supra note 8.
16. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
defendants in capital cases be given the opportunity to present independent mitigating evidence.
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
17. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
18. Id. at 321.
19. Id.
20. The Court deferred to the states "the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction" against executing the mentally retarded. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)). The Court cited the definitions provided by the
AAMR and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in its opinion. Id.at 304, 309 n.3.
21. Seeid.at321.
22. See supra text accompanying note 7.
23. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22.
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Association ("APA") in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders ("DSM-IV-TR") and by the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) (now the AAIDD).24 These definitions, though not
identical, describe the same small group •of26individuals 25-approximately one to
three percent of the general population. Every individual included in this
group is entitled to the Eighth Amendment's protection against execution. As
one federal judge has observed: "[B]oth the AAMR and DSM-IV-TR
definitions reflect a national consensus. Thus, to the extent there is a conflict,
27
should a defendant meet either definition, his execution is prohibited.,
The AAMR's 1992 definition of mental retardation, cited by the Court in
Atkins,28 was revised by the AAMR in 2002 to be "more consistent with widely
used assessment instruments and the research supporting them [and] with the
relevant inquiries in [the] criminal justice context., 29 The 2002 update was
intended "to state, describe, organize, and extend the thinking in the field of
mental retardation that has occurred over the past 10 years. 30 Thus, the
definition of mental retardation set forth in the AAMR's 2002 book is the most
accurate and reliable definition. That definition provides that mental retardation
is "a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and

24. Id. at 308 n.3. For a discussion of the AAMR's use of the term mental retardation and
its adoption of a new organizational name, see supra note 8. The DSM-IV-TR uses three criteria
to define mental retardation: "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,"
"significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two [of eleven] skill areas," and onset
before age eighteen. AM. PsYcHATRIc Ass'N, DIAGNOsTIc AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. The DSM-IV-TR also
categorizes mental retardation in four degrees of severity based on IQ: mild, moderate, severe,
and profound. Id. at 42.
25. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL &PHYSICAL DLSABILITY L. REP. 11, 12-13 (2003) (noting that the
various definitions are only important insofar as they are selected by legislatures and applied by
clinicians, attorneys, and courts). The medical profession has settled on its own "specific criteria
for diagnosis." See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Towarda Uniform Standardfor
Mental Retardationin Death Penalty Cases, 41 MENTAL RETARDATION 203, 204 (2003).
26. See, e.g., AAMR, supra note 8, at 52 ("[T]he general guideline for consideration of
intellectual functioning should be determined by professional clinical judgment and determined
to be below the level attained by approximately 97% of individuals ....
). Conversely,
approximately two to twenty-five percent of incarcerated offenders and four to twenty percent of
death row inmates in the United States are mentally retarded. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins
Aftermath: Identifying Mentally RetardedOffenders and Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J.
LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003) (citations omitted).
27. United States v. Nelson, 419 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894-95 (E.D. La. 2006).
28. See supra note 8.
29. Tobolowsky, supra note 26, at 100.
30. AAMR, supra note 8, at 5.
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31 The 2002
practical adaptive skills."
definition also specifies that onset occurs
32
eighteen.
age
before
The 2002 AAMR definition, the 1992 AAMR definition referenced in
Atkins,33 and the APA definition found in the DSM-IV-TR34 contain three
common elements: intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior, and age of
onset. 35 The AAMR and DSM-IV-TR clinical definitions vary slightly, most
prominently in their differentiation of the various skill areas considered in
evaluating an individual's limitations in adaptive behavior. 36 But the slight
variations do not result in any real differences in opinion about what constitutes
the disability or merits a diagnosis.
While state legislatures have not adopted a uniform definition of mental
retardation in response to Atkins, most state statutes quote verbatim or
substantially from one of the clinical definitions to which the Court referred.37
Other definitions provided by state legislation borrow from, but do not
replicate, clinical definitions.38 Still other statutes, including the federal statute

31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 8.
34. See supra note 24.
35. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (comparing the three
common elements of the 1992 AAMR definition and the DSM-IV-TR definition).
36. For example, the APA identifies the following skill areas as components of adaptive
functioning in the DSM-IV-TR: "Communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety." DSM-IV-TR, supranote 24, at 41. The AAMR, on the other hand, identifies
"three types of adaptive behavior" (conceptual, social, and practical) and "four other
dimensions" for consideration (intellectual abilities; participation, interactions, and social roles;
health; and context). AAMR, supra note 9, at 14.
37. See e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(K)(3) (Supp. 2008) (defining mental
retardation as "a condition based on a mental deficit that involves significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive
behavior, where the onset of the foregoing conditions occurred before the defendant reached the
age of eighteen"); N.Y. CniM. PROC. § 400.27(12)(e) (McKinney 2005) (defining mental
retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently
with deficits in adaptive behavior which were manifested before the age of eighteen"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a) (2006) (defining mental retardation to include "[s]ignificantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning," "deficits in adaptive behavior," and onset by the
age of eighteen); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.030(2)(a) (2008) (defining mental retardation as
"(i) [s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (ii) existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior; and (iii) both significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior were manifested during the developmental
period").
38. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (2007) (defining mentally retarded as "having
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning... to an extent which substantially
impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's
conduct to the requirements of law"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(6) (West Supp. 2008)
(requiring that deficits and limitations in adaptive behaviors be "continual" and "extensive").
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on the implementation of the death penalty, include no definition at all. 39 This
definitional inconsistency produces the anomaly that an individual spared
execution in one state because of mental retardation may nonetheless be subject
to execution in a neighboring state. And even those states that use the same
general definition of mental retardation apply and interpret the definitions
inconsistently.
A. IntellectualFunctioning
The first element of the definition of mental retardation addresses
intellectual functioning. A mentally retarded or intellectually disabled
'40
individual suffers from "significant limitations in intellectual functioning.
Intellectual functioning, more commonly referred to as intelligence, refers to an
individual's "general mental capability" and includes "reasoning, planning,
solving problems, thinking abstractly, comprehending complex ideas, learning
quickly, and learning from experience.'"
All states include subaverage intellectual functioning as an element of their
definition of mental retardation and thus require some means of measuring
intellectual functioning.42 The most common, though not the sole, method of
measuring an individual's intelligence is by IQ testing.43 The AAMR notes that
"intellectual functioning is still best represented by IQ scores when obtained
from appropriate assessment instruments. ' 4 The two most frequently used
testing instruments are the Wechsler scales for children and adults and
Stanford-Binet.45 The utility of IQ scores is greatly questioned, but most critics
39. The federal statute on mental capacity as it relates to a sentence of death simply states,
"A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded." 18
U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2006).
40. AAMR, supra note 8, at 8. The DSM-IV-TR refers to this element as "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 24, at 41.
41. AAMR, supra note 8, at 14. "[Ilintelligence is not merely book learning, a narrow
academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capacity for
comprehending our surroundings-catching on, making sense of things, or figuring out what to
do." Id.at 40.
42. David DeMatteo, Geoffrey Marczyk, & Michele Pich, A National Survey of State
LegislationDefining Mental Retardation:Implicationsfor PolicyandPracticeAfter Atkins, 25
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 781, 789 (2007).

43. AAMR, supra note 8, at 51.
44. 1d.at 41.
45. Id. at 59. The Atkins Court referred to the Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scales test as
"the standard instrument in the United States for assessing intellectual functioning." Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002). Other measures of intelligence include the Kaufman
Assessment Battery for Children, the Cognitive Assessment System, and other special tests for
individuals "with limited verbal ability or profound cognitive impairments." AAMR, supranote
8, at 59-60, 63-66; see generally ESTHER STRAuSs, ELISABETH M. S. SHERMAN & OTFRIED
SPREEN, A COMPENDIUM OF NEuROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTs: ADMINISTRATION, NORMS, AND
COMMENTARY 98-362 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2006) (explaining the multitude of tests that
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admit that the scores effectively predict certain kinds of achievement,
particularly educational achievement. 46 Most of the tests measure both verbal
and nonverbal intelligence functioning, but different tests assess "different
combinations of abilities.', 4 7 As a result, an individual's IQ often varies
between different tests.4a
Not all individuals have had appropriate or sufficient IQ testing during the
relevant time periods.4 9 For example, individuals who did not attend public
schools regularly or at all and individuals who immigrated to the United States
during their childhood may have never taken IQ tests. While federal law
requires school districts "to identify, locate, and evaluate all children" between
the ages of three and 21 who may have disabilities, numerous examples of
noncompliance exist.50 Even students regularly attending schools in the United
States may have attended noncompliant or underfunded schools and been
denied the benefit of standardized tests that are offered in other institutions.5'
The opposite problem occurs when an individual has taken numerous tests
that produce inconsistent scores.52 It is well established that an individual's
help determine levels of cognitive functioning).
46. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 45, at 100. Of course, many abilities cannot be ascertained
by intelligence tests including creativity, practical common sense, wisdom, and social skills.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Exparte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 165-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding
that the defendant was not mentally retarded based on the administration of"a few subsets" of
the Wechsler test from which a full scale IQ was determined).
50. MAT COHEN, A GUIDE TO SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY-WHAT PARENTS,
CLINICIANS AND ADVOCATES NEED TO KNOW 83 (Jessica Kingsley Publishers 2009). In July
2008, for example, the United States Department of Education reported that only thirteen states
met the requirements of Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),
which serves students ages three through 21. Press Release, U.S. Department of Education,
Determination Letters on State Implementation of the IDEA (July 9, 2008), available at
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/monitor/factsheet.pdf.
51. Congress passed the IDEA in 1975, guaranteeing "free appropriate public education"
to children with disabilities who are eligible for special education services. COHEN, supranote
50, at 9, 31. The IDEA encompasses thirteen categories of disability, including mental
retardation. Id.at 38. The IDEA entitles the student to a comprehensive evaluation based on a
number of assessment tools that are accurate and unbiased. Id.
at 30, 83-84. Although the IDEA
has been in effect for more than thirty years, its provisions have not always been rigorously
enforced. Id. at 9-10. Moreover, either a parent or the school system must first refer the child
for an evaluation. Id. at 80.
52. See e.g., Exparte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002) (finding that defendant
was not mentally retarded and attributing his declining intellectual functioning to alcohol
abuse); Lewis v. State, 889 So.2d 623,697-98 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (finding that defendant
was not mentally retarded despite a decline in intelligence testing scores from 109 to 58 and
attributing his childhood problems to his eventual diagnosis of personality disorder with
delusional features); Bums v. State, 944 So.2d 234, 247, 249 (Fla. 2006) (finding that defendant
was not mentally retarded based on IQ scores of 69 and 74); State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144,
152, 167 (Mo. 2008) (finding that defendant was not mentally retarded based on IQ scores of
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intelligence may vary over time, but some courts desirous of a simple, brightline cutoff use varying scores as a basis for finding an absence of the existence
of the first criteria of mental retardation.53
Moreover, mental health professionals agree that the reliability of IQ scores
is dependent upon the choice of test, 54 the competence of the examiner, 55 and
the interpretation of the results.5 6 The choice and time of the test can have a
dramatic effect on the measurement of an individual's intellectual
functioning.5 7 In addition, the AAMR stresses that intellectual functioning must
always be considered "within the context of community environments typical of
the individual's age peers and culture" and in consideration of "cultural and
linguistic diversity as well as differences in communication, sensory, motor,
and behavioral factors. 58
Even assuming well-chosen tests and professionally competent examiners
and assessors, an IQ test is an imperfect determinant of intellectual functioning
for many reasons, including the standard measurement of error. As the mental
health profession has cautioned, "all measurement, and particularly
77, 63,95, 78, 84,67, and 67 taken from 1968 to 2004); Myers v. State, 130 P.3d 262,267-68
(Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that defendant was not mentally retarded based on his ability
to drive, hold a job, and learn to read simple material, despite intelligence test scores that ranged
from 66 to 88 throughout his lifetime).
53. See e.g., Lewis, 889 So.2d at 697 (court found that previously IQ score in average
range "seriously undermine[d] IQ score indicating mental retardation"); Johnson, 244 S.W.3d at
152 (describing a situation in which the defendant had five IQ tests, with varying scores, where
the jury concluded the defendant was not mentally retarded and the judge affirmed the death
sentence); Myers, 130 P.3d at 267-68 (explaining that IQ scores ranging from 66 to 77 led the
court to conclude defendant was not mentally retarded); Salazar v. State, 126 P.3d 625, 628
(Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (noting the court reasoned that "a truly mentally retarded individual
will not, cannot produce test results over such a broad spectrum" because of scores ranging from
50 to 83); Hall v. State, 160 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc) (noting the
varying scores on a Test of Non-Verbal Intelligence ("TONI") led the court to conclude that
defendant was not mentally retarded).
54. The choice of tests depends on "the individual's social, linguistic, and cultural
background." AAMR, supra note 8, at 51; see also DSM-IV-TR, supranote 24, at 42 ("The
choice of testing instruments and interpretation of results should take into account factors that
may limit test performance (e.g., the individual's sociocultural background, native language, and
associated communicative, motor, and sensory handicaps).").
55. AAMR, supra note 8, at 51-52.
56. See id. at 51-52.
57. See, e.g., Hall, 160 S.W.3d at 24. In Hall,the defendant scored 84 on a TONI. Id. at
29. "The TONI test was designed primarily for students who were difficult to test, sometimes
because they did not speak English, or were paralyzed, or had some other disability not
necessarily related to intelligence that impeded the effectiveness of the more comprehensive,
individually-administered intelligence exams." Id. at 30. Under the Wide Range Achievement
Test, however, the defendant achieved scores of 59, 51, and 55 in reading, spelling, and
arithmetic, respectively. Id. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed a
holding that the defendant had not established subaverage intellectual functioning. Id. at 40.
58. AAMR, supra note 8, at 13.
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psychological measurement, has some potential for error." 59 The standard error
of measurement ("SEM") for well-standardized tests of general intellectual
functioning is estimated to be three to five points. 60 This rate of error may be
attributed to a variety of factors, including the performance of the test taker and
the behavior of the examiner. 6' Although IQ scores are expressed as a specific
number, the scores may actually represent "a range that would be
approximately three to four points above and below the obtained score. ' 6 2 As a
result of these variations, the mental health profession uses a range of numbers
to determine intellectual
functioning and specifically discourages any reliance
63
on a fixed cutoff.
While some states have heeded the scientific community's clear
precautions 64 and avoided fixed IQ cutoffs, 65 far too many have not. Some state
statutes define the intellectual functioning element of mental retardation to
requirean IQ score within a fixed cutoff.6 Courts have interreted other state
statutes, though less specific, to require a fixed IQ cutoff. By refusing to
consider the standard error of measurement, a court can find a defendant who
meets the medical profession's definition of subaverage intellectual functioning
59. Id.at 57.
60. Id.; see also Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A PsychiatricCan of Worms, 33
N.M. L. REv. 255, 269-70 (2003) ("Under the best conditions, IQ tests have a 'measurement
error' of about five points." (citation omitted)). "This means that if an individual is retested with
the same instrument, the second obtained score would be within one SEM (i.e., ± 3 to 4 IQ
points) of the first estimates about two thirds of the time." AAMR, supra note 8, at 57.
61. Id.
62. Id.The AAMR refers to this range as the "zone of uncertainty." Id.
63. Id.at 58. Also consider the approach taken by the DSM-IV-TR:
Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below
(approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean). It should be noted that there is a
measurement error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from
instrument to instrument ....
Thus, it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in individuals
with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant deficits in adaptive behavior.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 24, at 41-42.
64. See Mossman, supra note 60, at 269-70; Tobolowsky, supra note 26, at 96 ("[A]ny
state's use of a fixed IQ cutoff score, without reference to standard measurement error and other
factors concerning the specific instrument used, risks an inaccurate assessment of the intellectual
functioning component of the mental retardation definition.").
65. See, e.g., In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005) ("[A] fixed cutoff is
inconsistent with established clinical definitions...."); Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 106 (Ind.
2005) ("IQ tests are only evidence; they are not conclusive on either the subject's IQ or the
ultimate question of mental retardation."); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 388
(Ky. 2005) (Keller, J., dissenting) ("A score on an IQ test... is merely evidence of a person's
actual IQ.... [Such evidence] might also come in the form of expert testimony as to the margin
of error of a given testing procedure ....); Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa.
2005) ("[C]onsistent with both the [AAMR and DSM-IV-TR] classification systems, we do not
adopt a cutoff IQ score for determining mental retardation.").
66. See e.g., TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13-203(a) (West 2006).
67. Hawthorne, 105 P.3d at 560; State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 785-86 (Ind.2007).
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to be death eligible. For example, a defendant in an Ohio case was found not
to be mentally retarded despite an IQ score of 72 under one test.69 Although an
expert testified that IQ tests possess a margin of error and "some wiggle room
that goes about five points either way," the court rejected the argument for a
downward adjustment to 70, the state cutoff for mental retardation.7 °
In addition to issues created by the standard error of measurement, other
concerns about the validity of IQ scores exist. The validity of an IQ test score as
a measurement of intellectual functioning is affected by the differences in test
content, the age of the test taker, and the rise in national IQ scores over time,
which is commonly referred to as the Flynn effect. 7' Some courts reject IQ
cutoffs based on the age of the testing instrument as well72 as the Flynn effect,
which results in heightened scores over the life of a test.
Moreover, many contend that IQ tests only provide a valid measure of
intellectual functioning for native English speakers,73 creating yet another
difficulty for defendants who speak English only marginally or as a second
language. This concern is based not only on the fact that the tests are written in
English, but also that their content is largely "drawn from white, middle-class
culture. 74 Some argue that cultural test bias depresses IQ scores for
minorities,75 resulting in an over inclusion of non-native English speakers in the
68. See e.g., Phillips v. State, 984 So.2d 503,508, 513 (Fla. 2008) (finding that defendant
was not mentally retarded despite IQ scores ranging from 70 to 86); Jones v. State, 966 So.2d
319, 329 (Fla. 2007) (finding that IQ scores ranging from 67 to 75 did not equate to
"significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning"); Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655,
667, 668 (Fla. 2006) (finding that the defendant was not mentally retarded despite IQ scores
ranging from 69 to 75).
69. State v. Frazier, 873 N.E.2d 1263, 1290 (Ohio 2007).
70. Id. at 1291 (noting that the state's expert testified that he had "a '95% confidence
level' that Frazier's IQ test results were accurate within a range of a 71 IQ and 80 IQ).
71. The so-called "Flynn effect" is based on findings that the nation's IQ score increases
about three points a decade if the same testing instrument is used. Kenneth J. Weiss, Barbara
Haskins & Mark J. Hauser, Commentary: Atkins and Clinical Practice,32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 309, 310 (2004). Thus, using an outdated testing instrument can result in an
inflated IQ score. Id. To combat this effect, the test is "renormed" every fifteen to twenty years,
"making the test harder and 'hiding' the previous gains in IQ scores." Tomoe Kanaya, Matthew
H. Scullin, & Stephen J. Ceci, The Flynn Effect and US. Policies: The Impact of Rising IQ
Scores on American Society Via Mental RetardationDiagnoses, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 778,
778 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Ky. 2005) (Keller, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the Flynn effect and its potential to account for a three point error).
ContraExparte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (refusing to consider the
Flynn effect, which would have resulted in defendant's IQ falling between 64 and 69).
73. Harrison Kane, Straight Talk about IQ andthe Death Penalty, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV.
27, 29 (2003) (noting that "[f]or racial and ethnic groups whose native language is English, IQ
tests provide reliable and valid measures of cognitive ability").
74. Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the BriarPatch: Ethical Dilemmas Facing
PsychologistsFollowingAtkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REv. 121, 129 (2004).
75. See, e.g., State v. Were, No. C-030485, 2005 WL 267671, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
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class of protected individuals, while others contend that the differences are
insignificant.76
Because of this uncertainty, the mental health community has devised
methods to account for an individual's language particularities. 77 Nonetheless,
courts may refuse to accept the test results because of the controversy. Further,
courts may discount the results of special-circumstances tests that are adapted
for other languages under the premise that such tests are not the "gold
standard" for intelligence measurement in the United States. Finally, courts
may ignore altogether tests administered in other languages and countries
because of a dearth of information about or confidence in that country's testing
procedures. Because most states regard IQ tests as the appropriate means of
proving subaverage intellectual functioning 78 and place the burden of
establishing mental retardation on defendants, 79 many non-English-speaking
defendants are left without a means of establishing their mental retardation.
The mental health profession has established valid methods to determine an
individual's intellectual functioning in special circumstances, even in the
absence of standardized testing.80 These include, among others, circumstances
in which (1) the individual has a different cultural or linguistic background; (2)
"earlier information is lacking or incomplete;" (3) the individual suffers from
multiple disabilities making standardized assessment inappropriate; (4) "the
individual uses a language, dialect, or communication system that differs
significantly from that of the instrument's normative populations;" and (5)
"there is a risk of practice effects due to repeated use of the same instrument
outside of recommended time intervals. '8 1 Under these special circumstances,
"the general guideline for consideration of intellectual functioning should be
determined by professional clinical judgment."8 2 The AAMR indicates that
4, 2005) (finding that the defendant was not mentally retarded, despite having an IQ of 69, in
part based on expert testimony that the minority defendant's IQ score was likely depressed).
76. Kane, supra note 73, at 29-30.
77. See AAMR, supra note 8, at 94. Such a situation requires "the use of clinical
judgment to make decisions and/or to integrate the input from an interdisciplinary team whose
function is to blend the multidimensional assessment and contextual information." Id.
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(C) (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODEANN.§ 5-4618(a)(2) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-lg(b) (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1)
(West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(b) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)
(2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(1) (West 2006).
79. See e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(G) (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODEANN.§ 5-4618(c) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(3) (West Supp. 2009); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.31102(2) (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (LexisNexis 2008); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §
174.098(7) (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3913-203(c) (West 2006).
80. See AAMR, supra note 8, at 94.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 52. To support a diagnosis of subaverage intellectual functioning, the clinical
determination should be that the individual falls "below the level attained by approximately
97% of individuals." Id.
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such professional clinical judgment refers to a "high level of clinical expertise
and experience [that] emerges directly from extensive data." 83 Furthermore,
"[i]t is based on the clinician's explicit training, direct experience with people
who have mental retardation, and familiarity with the person and the person's
environments." 84
Some courts refuse to rely upon professional clinical judgment, instead
preferring the simplicity of a standardized test score.85 In the absence of an IQ
score derived from a standardized test, some courts have held that an
individual's intellectual functioning, and thus his or her mental retardation,
cannot be established.86 But this approach oversimplifies the complex and
critical importance of a mental retardation diagnosis. "As much as the criminal
justice system might prefer to have a hard-and-fast limitation measurable by a
single IQ score, it is simply impossible to exclude consideration of other factors
about the testing performed on the individual, or to ignore the need for clinical
judgment by experienced diagnosticians., 87 "A simple IQ score cannot possibly
consider 88the individual as a whole being within his or her unique life
context.,
Practitioners raising Atkins claims must educate the courts about the
complexity of intellectual functioning and discourage them from relying solely
on an IQ test score. If the client has tested slightly above the jurisdiction's
cutoff for mental retardation, counsel should offer expert proof about the
standard measurement of error, the Flynn effect, or other factors that affect test
validity. If the client has inconsistent IQ scores, counsel should produce experts
to explain whether the inconsistencies result from the choice of test, the choice
of examiner, the time of the test, or other factors such as the client's cultural or
linguistic background. If no IQ test scores during the relevant time period exist,
counsel must find experts to testify to an extrapolated score based on other
assessments and the application of professional clinical judgment. Only by
83. Id. at 95.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 174-75 (Tenn. 1991) (finding that
defendant was competent to stand trial despite a "consensus" from mental health professionals
that the defendant's IQ was "in the lower end of the normal range" and that he "probably
suffered a personality disorder of some sort").
86. See, e.g., Van Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 3327828, at
*26 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006) (refusing to rely on "social factors" as proof of mental
retardation in the absence of a test of intellectual functioning prior to the age of eighteen). The
Van Tran court specifically noted:
Although experts may offer insightful opinions on the question of whether a particular
person satisfies the psychological diagnostic criteria for mental retardation, the ultimate
issue of whether a person is, in fact, mentally retarded for purposes of the constitutional
ban on excessive punishment is one for the finder of fact, based upon all of the evidence
and determinations of credibility.
Id. at *24 (citations omitted).
87. Ellis, supra note 25, at 13 (footnote omitted).
88. Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 74, at 129.
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explaining the parameters within which the mental health profession evaluates
intellectual functioning can counsel hope to lead courts away from a onedimensional analysis.
B. Deficits in Adaptive Behavior
The problems inherent in assessing an individual's intellectual functioning
for purposes of diagnosing mental retardation8 9 are more problematic when
considered in light of the other two elements of the definition: limitations in
adaptive behavior and onset before age eighteen. The second element necessary
for a diagnosis of mental retardation requires significant limitations in
"adaptive behavior 9° or "adaptive functioning." 91 The mental health profession
uses this criterion as a means of determining a mentally retarded individual's
need for services and supports.92 The AAMR defines adaptive behavior as "the
collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been learned by
people in order to function in their everyday lives., 93 The DSM-IV-TR defines
adaptive functioning as "how effectively individuals cope with common life
demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence
expected of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background,
and community setting." 94 The AAMR's 2002 definition identifies three broad
domains of adaptive behavior (conceptual, social, and practical skills) 95 while
the APA's DSM-IV-TR lists eleven skill areas that are coextensive.96
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See AAMR, supra note 8, at 73.
91. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 24, at 42.
92. See AAMR, supra note 8, at 73, 81.
93. Id. at 73.
94. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 24, at 42.
95. AAMR, supranote 8, at 76. "Conceptual skills" include communication skills, money
concepts, and self-direction. Id.at 42. "Social skills" encompass interpersonal skills,
responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, naivetd, the ability to follow rules and laws, and the
avoidance of victimization. Id."Practical skills" include activities of daily living (such as eating,
dressing, preparing meals, taking medication, and managing money), occupational skills, and
the maintenance of safe environments. Id.
The AAMR's 1992 definition listed ten skill areas to be used in evaluating adaptive
behavior. Id. at 76. These skill areas were noted in Atkins. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,308
n.3 (2002). The primary use of the more differentiated skill areas in the 1992 version was for
"planning supports or educational programming" for those who were mentally retarded, not for
diagnosis. AAMR, supra note 8, at 81.
The purpose of conceptualizing the behavioral prong of the [ 1992 AAMR] definition around
"limitations in adaptive skill areas" was to focus the attention of diagnosticians more directly on
an individual's need for services and supports. While this is important to clinicians working in
the service delivery system, it obviously is less significant for evaluations performed for
criminal cases potentially involving capital punishment. Ellis, supra note 25, at 13 (footnote
omitted).
96. The DSM-IV-TR definition refers to "significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
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Limitations in adaptive behavior affect an individual's daily life as well as an
individual's ability to respond to the demands of life and the environment in
which he or she lives. Thus, the diagnostic focus is on the performance of
adaptive behavioral skills, not on their acquisition. An individual who has
"significant limitations... in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual,
social, or practical adaptive skills" meets the adaptive behavior criterion for
mental retardation. 97
To diagnose adaptive behavioral skills, mental health professionals rely
primarily upon information collected from interviews with third-party
"informants"--family members, custodians, school officials, friends, and
caregivers-and also collect and review school, military, medical, employment,
institutional, and health records.98 The ideal informant has been familiar with
the individual being assessed "over an extended period of time, preferably in
multiple settings."99 The process is complicated when these informants cannot
be accessed or do not exist. Mental health professionals also use standardized
assessment instruments to evaluate an individual's limitations in adaptive
behavior. But just as standardized IQ tests do not completely indicate
intellectual functioning, neither do adaptive behavior tests fully represent an
individual's capacity to adapt to life's demands. °° Nonetheless, mental health
professionals often use assessment instruments to evaluate whether an
individual suffers from limitations in adaptive behavior.' 01
Not surprisingly, instruments used to measure adaptive behavior suffer
from the same imperfections as those used to measure intellectual functioning.
Similar to tests designed to measure intellectual functioning, "no single
consistent [adaptive behavior] measurement device is used across all settings or
with all populations."' 0 2 Assessment of incarcerated individuals is particularly
difficult "because the structure and supports provided by a prison environment
tend to reduce (or at least alter) the environmental demands placed upon
inmates.' 0 3 Thus, the more reliable assessments are those that are conducted
before incarceration, but such tests may not be available, again requiring

at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety." DSM-IV-TR, supranote 24, at 41.
97. AAMR, supranote 9, at 39.
98. Id. at 85.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 75; see DSM-IV-TR, supranote 24, at 42.
101. See, e.g., AAMR, supranote 8, at 76-77, 87 (noting that "there are existing measures
that address the three dimensions of adaptive behavior" and that "[tihere has never been a
shortage of adaptive behavior scales"); STRAuss ET AL., supranote 45, at 1082-83 (mentioning
the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scales, Scales of
Independent Behavior, Comprehensive Test of Adaptive Behavior Revised, and the Adaptive
Behavior Assesment System as measures the AAMR lists for determining adaptive functioning).
102. Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 74, at 130.
103. Id. at 131.
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professionals to exercise clinical judgment in evaluating adaptive
functioning. 104
When standardized measures of adaptive behavior are used, the AAMR
indicates that a significant limitation in adaptive behavior exists when
"performance... is at least two standard deviations below the mean on at least
one domain or on the total score of an instrument that measures all three
domains."' 10 5 The DSM-IV-TR specifies that "significant limitations in adaptive
areas to satisfy its
functioning [must exist] in at least two" of eleven 0skill
6
second criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation.
Despite this correlation between the AAMR and DSM-IV-TR criteria,
courts engage in a variety of disparate interpretations of the adaptive behavior
element. Some courts, perhaps hoping to simplify a complex issue, use a strict
checklist approach and categorize adaptive behavioral skills narrowly rather
than as a multidimensional concept.10 7 A few courts, however, correctly
be applied flexibly,
recognize that the adaptive behavior element should
108
keeping in mind its purpose in the overall inquiry.
Practitioners must urge courts to interpret the adaptive behavior element of
mental retardation in conformity with the five basic assumptions that the

104. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
105. AAMR, supra note 8, at 78. The AAMR explains that although persons suffering from
mental retardation are assumed to have broad adaptive limitations, the requirement ofa score at
least two standard deviations below the mean on only one domain is justified for two reasons.
Id. Of particular significance is the fact that "the probability of a person scoring two standard
deviations below the mean on more than one domain would be so low that almost no one with
an IQ in the upper mental retardation range would be identified as having mental retardation."
Id. (citation omitted).
106. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 24, at 41.
107. See e.g., Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (listing
"evidentiary factors which factfmders in the criminal trial context might.., focus upon in
weighing evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder"); see also
State v. Brown, 907 So.2d 1, 31 (La. 2005) (noting a nonexclusive list of mental disorders and
diagnoses that may indicate mental retardation).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 419 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900-901 (E.D. La. 2006)
(finding that the defendant met the adaptive functioning criterion for mental retardation based
on several assessment tests, school records, and interviews); Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90,
109-110 (Ind. 2005) (commenting on Indiana's rejection of the DSM-IV-TR definition of
adaptive functioning as a definitive measure and noting that Indiana's statutory law "is much
more general and open-ended, requiring a showing of 'substantial impairment of adaptive
behavior' without specifying any particular skill levels" (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v.
Miller, 888 A.2d 624, 630-33 (Pa. 2005) (exploring both the AAMR and DSM-IV-TR
definitions of mental retardation, acknowledging standard error of measurement, declining to
adopt a cutoff IQ score for determining mental retardation, and examining test scores and expert
testimony to evaluate defendant's adaptive functioning); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7612b01(a) (1997) (defining adaptive behavior as "the effectiveness or degree with which an
individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of
that person's age, cultural group and community").
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AAMR has identified as "essential to the application of [its] definition."' 0 9 The
third assumption, that "[w]ithin an individual, limitations often coexist with
strengths," is particularly relevant to the assessment of limitations in adaptive
behavior. 10 Inherent in the requirement that significant limitations exist in at
least one of the AAMR's three domains of adaptive behavior (or two of the
DSM-1V-TR's eleven skill areas) to support a diagnosis of mental retardation"'
is this recognition that "[a]daptive skill limitations often coexist with strengths
in other adaptive skill areas." ' 1 2 "[T]he presence of a strength in a particular
[skill] area does not negate the coexistence of a limitation in another area of
sufficient significance to establish the adaptive behavior component of the
mental retardation definition."' 3 This overlap in skill areas is noted by the
AAMR: "[P]eople with mental retardation are complex human beings who
likely have certain gifts as well as limitations. Like all people, they often do
some things better than other things. Individuals may have capabilities and
strengths that are independent of their mental retardation." 4 But these
strengths do not preclude a diagnosis of mental retardation if all of the
requirements of the definition are satisfied, even if such strengths do not reflect
common stereotypes among non-experts of what a person with mental
retardation can do." 5
Notwithstanding this essential assumption, judges sometimes use their own
opinions about the significance of an individual's strengths to trump
standardized measures of adaptive behavior and professional clinical judgment.6
can drive,"
that a defendant
courts
For example,
117
118 routinely use the fact !19
12
120
2
marry, procreate, maintain relationships, work, or count'2 ' as a basis
109. AAMR, supranote 8, at 1.
110. Id.The other four assumptions necessary for the application of the AAMR definition
of mental retardation as are follows: "Limitations in present functioning must be considered
within the context of community environments typical of the individual's age peers and
culture;" "Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic diversity as well as differences in
communication, sensory, motor, and behavioral factors;" "An important purpose of describing
limitations is to develop a profile of needed supports;" and "With appropriate personalized
supports over a sustained period, the life functioning of the person with mental retardation
generally will improve." Id.
111. See supra notes 95-96, 105-106 and accompanying text.
112. AAMR, supra note 8, at 41.
113. Tobolowsky, supra note 26, at 97 (footnote omitted).
114. AAMR, supra note 8, at 8.
115. Ellis, supranote 26, at n.29; Tobolowsky, supra note 27, at 97.
116. See, e.g,, Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441,446-47 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
the defendant "was able to both drive a car and follow the speed limits of the [mobile home]
park"); Clemons v. State, No. CR-01-1355, 2003 WL 22047260, at *4 (Ala. Crim. App. Jun. 24,
2005) (noting that the defendant "was a delivery driver for Domino's pizza... [which] requires
...
a valid driver's license").
117. See, e.g., McGowan v. State, 990 So.2d 931,999 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Yeomans v.
State, 898 So.2d 878, 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (recognizing that the defendant "married
more than once").
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for concluding that, despite scientific evidence to the contrary, the defendant
does not suffer from sufficient limitations in adaptive behavior to satisfy the
definition of mental retardation. As one federal judge has noted, "[i]t is
important, in determining whether a person is or is not mentally retarded, not to
pick and choose so as to over-emphasize certain characteristics." ' 22 Yet, that is
exactly what some courts are doing. As a result, court findings reflect the
stereotypical view that mentally retarded individuals must be "utterly incapable
of caring for themselves, potentially dangerous, and 'unfit' to reproduce," as
was once believed. 123 Counsel should argue that reliance on an individual's
strengths to rebut an expert's opinion based on professional judgment and
scientific assessment
belies an assumption essential to the definition of mental
24
retardation.1
In addition to overemphasizing a defendant's strengths, prosecutors
sometimes ask courts to consider demographic facts, including a defendant's
cultural, social, medical, and economic background, tojustify rulings that are
inconsistent with clinical findings and expert opinions. 125 For example, as has
been noted with regard to intellectual-functioning tests, 26 courts have
discounted adaptive behavior assessments and clinical findings based on a
defendant's incarceration, co-existing mental illness, and language preference,
reasoning that such tests are normed only to an English-speaking, healthy, and
non-incarcerated American population. 27 Practitioners should point out the
118. See, e.g., McGowan, 990 So.2d at 999; Yeomans, 898 So.2d at 902; Stallworth v.
State, 868 So.2d 1128, 1182 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (noting that the defendant "fathered and
raised several children").
119. See, e.g., Clark, 457 F.3d at 446 (noting that the defendant socialized with others);
Stallworth, 868 So.2d at 1182 (noting that the defendant had had a long-term relationship).
120. See, e.g., McGowan, 990 So.2d at 999 (recognizing that the defendant had
"maintained construction jobs"); Stallworth, 868 So.2d at 1182 (noting that the defendant had
"maintained a job for most of his adult life" and worked as a cook, a brick mason, and a
landscaper).
121. See, e.g., Clemons, 2003 WL 22047260, at *4 (noting that the defendant, a pizza
delivery driver, "was expected to be able to make change out of the 'bank' that was provided").
122. Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1343 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
123. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS wrrH
MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: AN OVERVIEW, at n.21 (Mar. 2001),

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-01.htm#P206_25341.
124. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Rivera v. Dretke, No. B-03-139, 2006 WL 870927, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
31,2006) ("[T]he State asks this Court to ignore the verbal portion of the WAIS-mI test because
the test was administered in English and [the defendant's] English proficiency (or lack thereof)
renders it inaccurate.").
126. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
127. See e.g., State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234,1239-41 (Ariz. 2003) (noting co-existing mental
illnesses); Van Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 3327828, at *15-* 17
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006) (incarceration and language preferences); Exparte Rodriguez,
164 S.W.3d 400, 405-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Cochran, J., concurring) (noting co-existing
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inequitable ramifications of this specious reasoning. Isolating only the language
issue, one federal court commented on the result of denying Atkins protection to
these individuals:
[I]n theory, [a non-English speaking defendant], or someone similarly
situated, can never convincingly satisfy his burden of proof.. .because he
could never obtain a reliable score on any test recognized as the gold standard
due to the fact that his alleged lack of proficiency in English disqualifies him
from obtaining an accurate score in the first place .... [Such a result] is, in

effect, stating that only fluent English speakers can qualify for the
28 test that
may ultimately prove that they are entitled to the Atkins shield.1
Another problematic trend is the tendency of courts to conclude that an
individual's ability to engage in criminal conduct precludes a finding of
limitations in adaptive behavior. Some courts have concluded, without expert
opinion, that "being extensively involved in criminal activity" or having the
"ability to repeatedly engage in illegal behavior" negates proof of adaptive
behavioral limitations. While the sheer complexity of some offenses might
undermine a finding of adaptive behavioral limitations, criminal conduct may
also indicate the exact opposite. Research indicates, for example, that repetitive
maladaptive behavior "may be an adaptation judged by others to be undesirable
but often representing a response to environmental conditions and, in some
cases, a lack of alternative communication skills.

1 30

Thus, a court's view that

the ability to commit a crime indicates adaptation to an environment and
negates a finding of limitations in adaptive behavior directly conflicts with
scientific research that the ability to commit a crime may actually indicate a
maladaptation. Judges should be made aware, through expert testimony, of
these research findings that undermine their suppositions.
In addition to a focus on criminal behavior in general, the courts of several
states, including Tennessee,13 Georgia,132 Texas,133 and Alabama,' 34 have
mental illnesses).
128. Rivera, 2006 WL 870927, at *19. The AAMR indicates that defendants under these
types of special circumstances require professional clinical judgment in diagnosing mental
retardation. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
129. Clemons v. State, No. CR-01-1355,2003 WL 22047260, at *4 (Ala. Crim. App. Jun.

24, 2005).
130.
131.

AAMR, supra note 8, at 79.
See, e.g., Van Tran, 2006 WL 3327828, at *25 (finding that the defendant did not

prove mental retardation because, among other things, he knew the layout of the restaurant, "did
the talking with one of the victims," "went into the office to collect the jewelry," escaped, and
subsequently sold the jewelry and divided the proceeds).
132. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 876 (Ga. 2003) (finding that the
defendant was not mentally retarded based on his actions in gaining the confidence of his
eventual victims, taking items of value from the houses he robbed, selling the items to finance

his escape, navigating interstate highways without the use of a map, attempting to delay
detection by cutting a phone line and removing a license tag on a stolen car, and providing an
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routinely focused on the facts of the underlying crime to refute clinical
judgment that defendants suffer from limitations in adaptive behavior. One
court has even developed its own list of questions to assess a defendant's
adaptive behavior limitations, including whether the defendant "formulated
plans and carried them through," whether the defendant can "hide facts or lie
effectively in his own or others' interests," and whether "the commission of
[the] offense
require[d] forethought, planning, and complex execution of
135
purpose.'

Far too few courts have realized the circularity of this reasoning-that a
person who can plan and commit a crime cannot suffer from limitations in
adaptive behavior and thus cannot be mentally retarded. As a federal court
explained, holdings that use the facts of the crime to refute expert opinions as
to mental retardation "may be a circular evasion of the Atkins majority opinion.
... Neither Atkins nor [other precedent] suggest that [heinous] crimes render a
defendant ineligible for exemption from the death penalty based on mental
retardation.' 36 With similar sentiment, a state appellate court twice reversed
and remanded a capital case based on the introduction of irrelevant facts about
13 7
the crime during the hearing to determine the defendant's mental retardation.
But these examples are the exception, not the rule. Practitioners can expose
such faulty reasoning by introducing expert testimony.
However, even if experts testify, courts may substitute their own judgment
to circumvent the findings and opinions of mental health professionals with
regard to behavioral limitations. Courts should consider expert opinion when
alias to police).
133. See, e.g., Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441,446 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
defendant had adaptive functioning because of his actions in committing the crime, "including
removing the butt stock of his gun to make it easier to conceal, purchasing ammunition for the
gun, practicing with the gun, and removing evidence from the scene and concealing it"). The
Fifth Circuit specifically noted that "evidence of a strength in a particular area of adaptive
functioning necessarily shows that the defendant does not have a weakness in that particular
area." Id. at 447.
134. See, e.g., Exparte Smith, No. 1010267, 2003 WL 1145475, at *10 (Ala. Mar. 14,
2003) (finding that the defendant did not suffer from adaptive behavior limitations based on his
actions in giving a police officer a false name, enlisting the help of a friend to dispose of a gun,
and shooting victims to eliminate witnesses); Clemons, 2003 WL 22047260, at *4 (noting that
the defendant did not lack adaptive functioning because his "post-crime conduct supports the
notion that he was a crafty criminal intent on minimizing his culpability and establishing a
defense to his crime").
135. Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Exparte
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
136. Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1347 n.30 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (citation
omitted).
137. See Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 655-59 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Lambert v.
State, 71 P.3d 30, 31-32 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). The defendant's two death sentences were
subsequently modified to two life without the possibility of parole sentences. Lambert, 126 P.3d
at 659.
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"[t]he conclusions of physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field
will bear upon the proper analysis." 18 Without question, accurate professional
assessment of adaptive behavior limitations is essential to a fair evaluation of a
claim of mental retardation.' 39 Judges are ill-equipped to make these
assessments on their own. Fortunately, practitioners are in a position to curb
this judicial behavior by consistently building a clear record of expert proof.
Experts should explain the role that professional clinical judgment plays in
assessing adaptive behavior,' 4 intellectual functioning,1 4 ' and ultimately mental
retardation. Specifically, experts should describe how properly trained mental
health professionals use clinical judgment to evaluate individuals who come
from different cultural or linguistic backgrounds. In addition, the role that
clinical judgment plays in circumstances in which "earlier information is
lacking or incomplete," "difficulties arise in selecting informants or validating
informant observations," and "direct observation of the individual's actual
performance has been limited...,,1 4 2 should be clarified to the court.
The Supreme Court in Atkins did not mandate the application of a
particular mental health standard for mental retardation, 143 but it did recognize
the significance of professional standards and framed the constitutional
prohibition in medical rather than legal terms.144 The Supreme Court, in Ake v.
Oklahoma, recognized in a separate but related context that accuracy in
diagnosing mental conditions is best achieved by seeking guidance from mental
health professionals:
[T]he assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's
ability to marshal his defense.... Further, where permitted by evidentiary
rules, psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into language that will
assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning
for the task at hand. Through this process of investigation, interpretation, and
testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no
training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated determination
145
about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense.
Similarly, the AAMR has noted that "mental retardation is not susceptible
to evaluation by non-experts, and the disability only can be assessed through
scientific tests administered by experienced professionals
in the field using their
46
training, experience, and clinical judgment.'
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
Arellano,

Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2863 (2007).
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1985).
See supra text accompanying note 105.
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2, 20 and accompanying text.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1985).
Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation as Amici Curiae at 21, State v.
143 P.3d 1015 (Ariz. 2006) (No. CV-05-0397-SA).
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Although the Supreme Court recognized in Ake that "there often is no
single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case,, 147
such an analysis is apropos to a diagnosis of mental retardation. Mental
retardation is a medical construct, not a legal one. 148 Practitioners must urge
courts to avoid the unacceptable risk of error that accompanies the substitution
of uninformed judicial judgment for expert opinion. In order to achieve
heightened reliability, judges should be receptive to expert testimony and
hesitant to substitute personal observations, unfair assumptions, and
stereotypical conclusions for expert findings. When courts disregard expert
testimony in favor of their own misinformed speculations, they not only violate
the Eighth Amendment's heightened fairness requirement, 149 but they also run a
high risk that a mentally retarded offender will be executed.
C. Age of Originationor Onset
The problems relevant to the intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior
elements of the definition of mental retardation are exacerbated by the
application of the third element of the definition: the time at which the
disability begins. The 1992 and 2002 AAMR definitions require manifestation
of mental retardation before the age of eighteen. " 0 The purpose of this onset
requirement is not to exclude some people with intellectual disabilities from the
mental retardation category, but rather to differentiate between individuals with
mental retardation and individuals with other mental deficits caused by injuries
or diseases that occurred during adulthood.15 1 The mental health profession has
noted that this distinction between childhood and adult onset "is considerably
more relevant to clinicians designing habilitation plans and systems of supports
for an individual than it is to the criminal justice system, since later-occurring
disabilities ... would involve comparable reduction in culpability for any
criminal act." 152 As one expert has suggested, "if there were a capital
prosecution of an individual who met the definition of mental retardation except

147. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
148. Richard J. Bonnie, The American PsychiatricAssociation'sResource Document on
MentalRetardationand CapitalSentencing: Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCmATRY L. 304, 304-05 (2004) ("One of the striking aspects of the Atkins decision is that
the constitutional prohibition appears to be framed in the language of a clinical diagnosis'mental retardation'-and not in terms of a traditional legal concept, such as competence or
responsibility.").
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. AAMR, supra note 8, at 22-23. In order to differentiate it from other disabilities,
early definitions of mental retardation, up to and including the 1983 AAMR definition, required
that manifestation occur "during the developmental period." Id.at 21-22.
151. Ellis, supra note 25, at 13.
152. Id.
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for the age on onset, principles of equality likely would require comparable
exemption from capital punishment."
The mental health community has cautioned against a rigid adherence to an
inflexible onset requirement.' 54 Since "[a]lmost every person with the requisite
level of intellectual impairment and adaptive behavior deficit has had the
disability since birth or childhood,"' 55 the onset requirement should not be
considered essential to the definition of mental retardation. Some states have
adhered to the medical profession's guidance by requiring onset during the
developmental period but not mandating a specific age of onset.' 56 However,
most states continue to require proof of onset by age eighteen' 57 and disregard
alternative proof of onset methods, despite the contrary recommendations of the
mental health profession.1 58 By reading the onset element as a hard and fast rule
and applying it without exception, courts create an artificial barrier to the
Eighth Amendment's protection for the mentally retarded.
When read inflexibly, the AAMR definition of mental retardation would
require that an individual's "significant limitations both in intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior" originate before age eighteen. 59 Because
courts often find that the "diagnosis of mental retardation in an adult must be
based on present or current intellectual functioning and adaptive skills and
information that the condition also existed in childhood,' 160 a strict
153. Id. at 21 n.33 (noting that legislatures through definition, courts through
proportionality review or constitutional protections, or governors through clemency proceedings
must disallow the execution of such an individual).
154. See id. (noting that the onset element of the definition of mental retardation should be
more fluid than the other two elements for purposes of enforcing the death penalty).
155. Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation, supra note 146, at 17
(footnote omitted).
156. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-1101(2) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7131 (a)(3) (2008); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (LexisNexis 1999). Other states have
deleted an onset requirement altogether. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-105.01(3) (2008); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2. 1(A) (LexisNexis 2000). Still other states have set the age of onset
beyond the age of eighteen. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 1998)
(stipulating that manifestation occur before the age of twenty-two); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 2-202(b)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2002) (stipulating that manifestation occur before the age of
twenty-two).
157. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(K)(3) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4618(a)(1)(A) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (West Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7612b01(d) (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(6) (West Supp. 2008); TENN. CODEANN. § 39-13203(a)(3) (West 2006).
158. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 653 S.E.2d 31, 35 (Ga. 2007) (adhering to the strict cutoff
of eighteen years of age for manifestation of mental retardation despite the defendant's assertion
that he "possessed the same attributes of a juvenile offender that prompted the United States
Supreme Court to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on offenders under age 18").
159. Bonnie, supra note 149, at 305.
160. Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319, 327 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Neal v.
State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (finding that despite an existing inability to
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interpretation of the onset requirement would require evaluation, assessment,
and perhaps diagnosis before age eighteen. Thus, an adult with present existing
limitations in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior would be unable to
meet the definition unless he or she was tested or evaluated before the age of
eighteen. Individuals who have been raised by caring, educated, and observant
parents, attended quality schools, and had attentive pediatricians can easily
prove the existence of limitations in intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior before age eighteen. These individuals were likely evaluated for
limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior during their
childhood years, particularly if any problems were noted. Such evaluations
would likely have been documented in educational, social service, and medical
records from childhood. Through these records, an individual's level of
intellectual and behavioral functioning before the age of eighteen can be readily
ascertained. 161 In fact, school records, medical records, family histories, and
social histories are recognized by the mental 162
health profession as the most
acceptable means of establishing age of onset.
However, establishing age of onset is much more difficult, perhaps
impossible, for a second group of individuals-those who were without
consistent parental care, those whose parents are also mentally challenged,
those who were born into poverty, those who did not regularly attend school,
and those who did not receive periodic health care. Records and memories that
do exist may be sparse,1 63 and in cases of very poor or immigrant individuals,
records may not exist at all. 64 The very factors that place an individual at risk
for mental retardation-poverty, lack of access to medical care, impairment of
caregivers, chronic family illness, child abuse and neglect, social deprivation,
and parental cognitive disability16 5-are the same factors that dramatically
impact an individual's ability to prove the existence and onset of mental
retardation.
While test scores and behavior assessments indicating significant
limitations before age eighteen are the traditional means of establishing age of

cope in society, as well as behavior- and personality-related problems, the defendant "failed to
establish the onset before age 18 of either significant sub-average general intellectual
functioning or limitations in adaptive functioning").
161. See Bonnie, supra note 149, at 307.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, No. C-050914, 2006 WL 2788504, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 29, 2006) (characterizing the defendant's evidence of mental retardation onset before the
age of eighteen as "scant" even though a school report classified him as such); Exparte Blue,
230 S.W.3d 151, 163-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding that the defendant was not mentally
retarded based on only the "anecdotal evidence" and "sketchy grade school records" that he
offered as evidence).
164. See, e.g., Pizzuto v. State, 202 P.3d 642 (Idaho 2008) (upholding grant of summary
judgment to state based on defendant's inability to prove IQ at age eighteen when only testing
occurred when defendant was twenty-eight).
165. AAMR, supra note 8, at 127.
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onset, 66 practitioners should be aware that they are not the only methods
available. For example, teachers, guidance counselors, and other school
officials may testify to intellectual functioning as demonstrated by school
167
achievement and advancement during the defendant's formative years.
Family members, custodians, friends, and associates can testify to the
defendant's social skills before adulthood, including level of responsibility,
self-esteem, gullibility, naivetd, and compliance with rules. 168 Those same
individuals can comment on practical life skills including hygiene, selfdirection, money management, occupational skills, and self-care existing before
age eighteen. 169 In addition, a multitude of risk factors for mental retardation
has been medically established. 170 "Mental retardation can be caused by any
condition that impairs development of the brain before birth, during birth, or in
the childhood years. 1 71 These include genetic conditions, problems during
pregnancy, problems at and after birth, and poverty and cultural deprivation. 172
Thus, childhood onset of mental retardation may be indicated through historical
evidence of family background, 173 the circumstances of an individual's birth,
and childhood diseases.1 4 In fact, the link between five risk factors for mental
retardation-poverty, childhood abuse and neglect, social and emotional
dysfunction, alcohol and drug abuse, and crime-has been described as "so
tight in the lives of many capital defendants as to form a kind of social
historical 'profile'. '
After conducting a thorough investigation into the client's background,
counsel will be able to identify alternative sources of proof of age of onset.
Counsel should introduce this evidence along with expert testimony identifying
the age of onset and substantiating the use of alternative sources of proof.
However, counsel should also educate the court about the limited purpose of
the onset requirement and the inappropriateness of allowing the absence of
proof of onset to trump clear evidence of limitations in intellectual functioning
and adaptive behavior.

166. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
168. AAMR, supra note 8, at 42.
169. Id.
170. See generally AAMR, supra note 8, at 123-41 (discussing numerous risk factors
linked to mental retardation).
171. The Arc, Causes and Prevention of Mental Retardation (May 2005),
http://www.thearc.org/NetCommunity/Document.Doc?&id=147.
172. Id.
173. The Arc, Genetic Causes of Mental Retardation (December 1996),
http://www.thearc.org/NetCommunity/Document.Doc?&id--92 ("Up to 60 percent of severe
mental retardation can be attributed to genetic causes ....
").
174. The Arc, Causes and Prevention of Mental Retardation, supra note 171.
175. Craig Haney, The Social Context ofCapitalMurder: SocialHistoriesandthe Logic of
Mitigation,35 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 547, 580 (1995).
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CONCLUSION

"[I]n the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore
conclude that [capital punishment of the mentally retarded] is excessive and
that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to
take the life' of a mentally retarded offender.' ' 176 With those words, the United
States Supreme Court promised those who had been treated differently in life
because of their intellectual disabilities 177 would also be treated differently in
death by exempting them from capital punishment. While the Atkins Court
imposed a "substantive restriction" on the power to execute the mentally
1
8
retarded, "the substantive right runs only as far as its effective enforcement."'
The Atkins promise has been effectively annulled by state court decisions and
will remain illusory as long as state legislatures apply inconsistent definitions of
mental retardation with varying burdens of proof and state courts use specious
reasoning and subjective interpretations. This leaves to practitioners the task of
preserving the Eighth Amendment's special protection for the mentally
retarded. By aggressively litigating claims of mental retardation and exposing
the present inequities, counsel will underscore the shameful unfairness of a
system in which the Eighth Amendment's meaning depends on the location of
an individual's prosecution.

176. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 405 (1986)).
177. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the sterilization of a mentally
retarded woman as involuntary and stating that "[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,... society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind").
178. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessonsfrom Substance and
Procedurein the ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment,57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721,
734 (2008).

